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exchange reserves are used to reassess the ﬁnancial history of the 1956 Suez crisis. We
ﬁnd that support of sterling at its Bretton Woods lower bound lost credibility as early as
July. Reserve losses also are consistent with an exchange rate crisis. We provide the ﬁrst
econometric study of foreign exchange market intervention in the pre-convertibility phase
of the Bretton Woods system. The Bank of England’s interventions reacted strongly both
to oﬃcial sterling and to the transferable sterling market in New York, which suggests that
convertibility was a central goal of policy.
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the paper.1. INTRODUCTION
On November 5, 1956, British and French paratroops landed at Port Said, at the
head of the Suez Canal, to be followed by a naval armada. On the afternoon of the next
day Harold Macmillan, the British Chancellor of the Exchequer, told the Cabinet that
$280 million of foreign exchange reserves had been lost in the previous week and that
the sterling exchange rate could not be held without help from the United States. The
Eisenhower administration was strongly opposed to the invasion, so Macmillan persuaded
his colleagues that there was no choice but to accept the UN demand for a cease-ﬁre.1
This account was until recently the accepted explanation for the outcome of the Suez
imbroglio. With the opening of the archives in recent years historians have drawn diﬀerent
conclusions. In particular Kunz (1989,1991) argued that there was no documentary evi-
dence for a serious run on the pound in the week of the invasion and that less than $100
million were lost in the ﬁrst week of November. The most recent comprehensive history of
the Suez crisis by Kyle (1991) ampliﬁed Kunz’s conclusions by suggesting that Macmillan’s
belief that sterling was under pressure reﬂected a ‘sensational loss of nerve.’2
These claims suggest to us that the economic aspects of the Suez aﬀair are ripe for
re-examination. Neither Kyle nor Kunz made any detailed reference to reserve movements.
Furthermore, the level of foreign exchange reserves is not the only indicator of pressure on
a ﬁxed exchange rate. The recent literature on target zones has yielded simple tests for
credibility based on the position of forward rates in relation to an exchange-rate band. We
analyze sterling credibility during the Suez crisis and supply a comprehensive description
of the movements of British reserves. Our analysis uses daily data which allow a precise
examination of the relation between economic pressures and political events.
Section 2 provides a brief historical background. We next document that there was a
foreign exchange crisis. Section 3 analyzes sterling credibility during the crisis, and section
4 describes the behavior of reserves. We ﬁnd that the weakness of sterling is underestimated
by recent historical accounts.
Section 5 studies the reaction function of the Bank of England in defending the pound.
The Bank’s interventions can be modeled much like those of central banks during more
recent dirty ﬂoats. We provide the ﬁrst econometric study of intervention during the per-
1convertibility phase of the Bretton Woods system. The convertibility of sterling at a ﬁxed
rate had been an oﬃcial commitment since the Anglo-American ﬁnancial agreement of
1946, though some researchers have questioned the strength of this commitment, pointing
to debates within the Treasury and the Bank of England on this question (see Fforde, 1992,
p. 221). Our results shed new light on this issue, for we ﬁnd that the Bank reacted strongly
to movements of both oﬃcial and transferable sterling in New York, which suggests that
convertibility was an important policy goal in 1956.
2. BACKGROUND
This section presents a thumbnail sketch of the events of the Suez crisis. Appendix
A contains a more detailed chronology of events which may have inﬂuenced the foreign
exchange market’s perception of the strength of sterling.
On July 26 1956 Gamal abd-al-Nasir, Rais (President) of Egypt, whose relations with
Israel had been sliding towards war, made a new set of enemies when he nationalized the
Suez Canal, which was owned by an international ﬁrm under Anglo-French control. It
is clear from all accounts that Britain and France were determined to reverse this action.
Their governments were angry over the expropriation and regarded Egyptian control of the
canal as a serious strategic threat to consumers of non-dollar oil supplies from the Middle
East (see Kunz, 1991, p. 87).
During the next three months, Egyptian pilots proved that they could successfully
conduct ships through the canal. Britain and France tried to regain control of the canal
through negotiations, supported by sanctions and by the eﬀorts of the United States and
other interested parties. However, the failures of the Canal Users Conferences disappointed
hopes of a peaceful solution attained by international cooperation. Two major complicating
factors were the tensions between Israel and Jordan, which some observers thought could
bring Britain into action against Israel as well as against Egypt, and the turmoil in Eastern
Europe, ﬁrst in Poland and then even more seriously in Hungary.
Eventually the British government agreed to a French plan that their joint forces
would occupy the canal zone. The Israelis, acting in collusion with them, would supply
the pretext for this invasion by occupying the Sinai peninsula. This subterfuge was worked
2out in the notorious S` evres agreement. Britain and France hoped to claim that they were
merely separating the warring parties in order to safeguard an international waterway.
The second and most acute phase of the Suez Crisis thus began on October 29 when Israel
invaded the Sinai peninsula.
If Britain and France hoped for support from the United States the timing of the
invasion could not have been less opportune, given that it coincided with the Hungarian
uprising and the US election. The US administration opposed the invasion from the start.
Once all parties had agreed to the cease-ﬁre, the US used all the economic means at
its disposal to force an unconditional withdrawal by the Anglo-French force. It was not
able to immediately end the British and French action though, because the British Cabinet
thought that the bridgehead its forces still held gave it a signiﬁcant bargaining counter with
Egypt. The US administration then used various economic means including blocking access
to IMF credit and preventing Britain from using US government securities as collateral
against new commercial borrowing.
Intense economic and diplomatic pressure ﬁrst led to Macmillan’s key statement to
parliament on November 13 that the sterling parity could not be held indeﬁnitely and then
to Eden’s withdrawal on November 23 on the grounds of ill health. When the US voted
with the Eastern Bloc and the non-aligned nations in the Security Council on November
24 it became evident that the economic pressure would not cease. Britain and France gave
way and withdrew from their bridgehead at the beginning of December 1956. In response
to their withdrawal, the US immediately granted Britain an Export-Import (EXIM) Bank
loan of $500 million and dropped its objections to Britain drawing the ﬁrst two tranches
of its IMF quota.
3. THE MORGENSTERN-SVENSSON TEST OF STERLING CREDIBILITY
We ﬁrst examine the implications of the crisis for the credibility of the sterling-dollar
exchange rate. The existence of upper and lower bounds for the nominal exchange rate
under the Bretton Woods system allows us to use tools developed to study exchange-rate
target zones. Deﬁne et as the value of the pound in U.S. dollars, it as the monthly nominal
interest rate in dollars, and i∗
t as the sterling interest rate. Investors in New York could
3buy pounds at rate et, invest them for one month at rate i∗
t then convert the proceeds
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In 1951 the Bank of England had ceased to ﬁx oﬃcial forward rates and had allowed
free forward dealing in all convertible currencies.3 Thus an alternative strategy was to take
a covered position, purchasing a one-month forward contract at the same time as the spot
purchase. In that case the maturing investment in pounds could be converted to dollars
at the known forward rate f1









then it is easy to see that
e ≤ f1
t ≤ e. (4)
If the Bretton Woods bounds were credible, then the forward rate should lie between them.
Examining this condition yields Svensson’s (1991) simplest test of target zone credibility,
also suggested by Morgenstern (1959, ch. 7). This test does not require that uncovered
interest parity holds. We examine condition (4) directly, rather than using interest-rate
data, because we have daily data on exchange rates.
Giovannini (1993) argued that measuring credibility using interest-rate diﬀerentials
or forward rates may be inappropriate because of the pervasiveness of capital controls
during the ﬁrst phase of the Bretton Woods system. However, capital controls do not
appear to have had a large eﬀect on interest rates. We have examined departures from
covered interest parity (a measure of capital controls) in weekly data. These departures
never exceeded 2 percent, a value comparable to Obstfeld’s (1993) ﬁndings for the 1960s.
4Furthermore, there was virtually no forward intervention by the Bank of England during
this period, so the forward rate reﬂected the market’s expectations.
Moreover, capital controls also could be avoided. Britain had resumed a range of
exchange controls after its experiment with convertibility in July 1947. However, by 1956
capital-account restrictions were still in force only for UK residents and for holders of
sterling whose balances had been blocked or restricted following the 1939-1945 war. Even
these restrictions could be avoided by several methods. First, long-held sterling balances
could be converted into dollars with the transaction represented as current. Second, UK
residents could purchase dollar securities elsewhere in the sterling area, notably those
owned by residents of Kuwait and Hong Kong.4 Schenk (1994) documented the fall in the
dollar value of sterling in Hong Kong during the Suez crisis. Third, speculation could take
place through ‘leads and lags’, changes in the timing or invoicing of imports and exports.
For example, dollar payments from sterling area residents could be hastened, and their
dollar receipts delayed, in expectation of a sterling depreciation. These methods were
widespread in the UK in July 1947, and so were well-known in 1956.5 It appears that large
investors faced no serious obstacles in purchasing dollars. The Midland Bank was thought
to have purchased $20-30 million and Shell $53 million during the Suez crisis.6 Moreover,
the crisis ended without a tightening of capital controls, as reserves were replenished by
loans from the IMF and the Export-Import Bank in December 1956.
The existence of exchange controls does preclude us from carrying out comparable
analysis for France, though. France still had an extensive system of multiple exchange
rates in 1956, as described by de Lattre (1958, ch. 2-4). In particular, the forward market
was limited to trade ﬁnance only and the forward rate hardly ﬂuctuated, changing its value
only three times during the Suez crisis. Since the franc was not yet convertible, concepts
which are designed to analyze convertible currencies are clearly not applicable. During the
Suez crisis, Britain was more economically vulnerable than France because sterling was
virtually convertible, and not simply because France drew on its IMF credit in advance of
the invasion.
France’s decision to draw on IMF standby credit is presented in the recent literature
as evidence that the French government displayed greater realism and foresight than the
5British (see Horne, 1988, p. 433 and Kunz, 1991, pp. 192-193). This conclusion ignores
the economic circumstances of 1956. Unlike Britain, which had a small current account
surplus in the ﬁrst half of 1956, France already had a large deﬁcit. This deﬁcit justiﬁed the
request strictly under grounds of the balance of payments. It is not clear what justiﬁcation
Britain could have given for such a request under IMF rules. British oﬃcials feared that an
application to the IMF would put Britain “in the same category as France,” whose currency
was inconvertible and not an international vehicle currency.7 Their preferred strategy was
to request direct US aid, such as an EXIM Bank loan, because they believed that this
aid would strengthen ﬁnancial markets’ conﬁdence in sterling by demonstrating that the
United States supported British policy towards Egypt.8
Giovannini (1993) plotted three-month forward rates and the Bretton Woods bands
during the 1950s. He found a large movement in the franc in the autumn of 1956 and also
that forward sterling lay outside the band during part of 1956.9 It is notable that he found
that the only other time that the pound lay outside the band was during the months before
the devaluation of 1967. His data were monthly. We now use daily data, which allow a
more precise description of the loss of credibility.
Figure 1 shows the sterling spot rate during the Suez crisis and in the months before
and after it took place. Data are daily exchange rates in New York, described in Appendix
B. The horizontal, dashed line shows the central parity, while the upper and lower edges of
the ﬁgure coincide with the Bretton Woods band, {e, e}. In early July, sterling was below
its $2.80 parity, a condition attributed by The Economist to a balance of payments deﬁcit
in 1955 having reduced reserves, and to an expectation of grain imports from the dollar
area later in 1956.10 The nationalization of the canal triggered a decline in the exchange
rate from above 2.79 to just above the bottom of the Bretton Woods band. The Economist
described $2.781
4 as the eﬀective support point and this ﬂoor is evident in ﬁgure 1.11
Figure 2 shows the rates for one, two, and three-month forward sterling in the New
York market. The horizontal, dashed line again shows the central parity value of the spot
rate, and the horizontal, solid line shows the lower edge of the spot rate band, e. Some
historians view July 19 as the beginning of the crisis, but there is little evidence of that in
ﬁnancial markets, except in three-month forward rates, which dropped a cent in New York
6that day. All three forward rates show the same pattern, starting with a loss of credibility
immediately after Nasser nationalized the canal on July 26. Only the one-month rate
brieﬂy rose above e at any time during the remainder of 1956. Credibility at all three
maturities was not regained until the middle of January 1957. This restoration probably
reﬂected Britain’s successful repayment of the yearly installment of her interest payments
due under the Anglo-American Agreement of 1946. As this was the major ﬁnancial event
at the end of the year, it seems that the British attempts to win a waiver from the US
on war debt payments had caused a serious lack of credibility.12 It also seems that the
negotiations of October were regarded by the market as only postponing a sterling crisis,
because only the one-month rate moved to the inside of the band then.
Comparing the forward rates with the spot rate makes it clear that the theoretical
stabilizing properties of exchange-rate bands were not operating in this case. Target-zone
theory predicts that reversion to parity is expected as the exchange rate nears the edge of
the band.13 In that case the pound should go to a forward premium when the spot rate
falls below its central parity. In fact, during the Suez crisis forward rates moved in the
same direction as the spot rate and moved outside the band when the spot rate was near
its lower limit.
The daily data allow us to look in more detail at the eﬀects of Anglo-French and
Israeli operations on the foreign exchange market. The two- and three-month rates moved
relatively little from the end of October to the last week of November. This fact conﬁrms
that the threat to the pound predated the operation and that the recent historical literature
has been right to assert that nothing decisive happened during the ﬁrst week of November.
On the other hand the one-month rate shows a clear reaction to the Israel Defense Force
entering Sinai on October 29, when the rate crossed the lower boundary of the band. The
reaction comes before Britain and France vetoed the Security Council’s censure of Israel
on October 30 and shows that observers were linking Israeli actions to the canal crisis.
The second major decline in the forward rates begins on November 23, the day that Eden
removed himself to Jamaica, ostensibly for health reasons. Figure 2 also shows a spike in
the forward rates on December 11, which most likely constitutes a response to the IMF
grant of a standby credit to Britain.
7It seems unlikely that the movements of the forward rate reﬂected a response to the
Hungarian uprising as well as to the Suez crisis. Giovannini (1993), using monthly data,
found that the three-month deutsche mark rate, which one would expect to respond to
events in Hungary, remained well within the center of the Bretton Woods band during
the two crises. This ﬁnding should be treated with some caution, though, because the
convertibility of the mark in the dollar area was restricted in this period (see International
Monetary Fund, 1957, p. 66). Unfortunately, the Swiss franc, which might be expected to
appreciate in response to the crisis in Hungary, as a ‘safe haven’ currency, was also not fully
convertible in 1956 (see International Monetary Fund, 1957, p 67). Both countries were
members of the European Payments Union and so their currencies were not convertible
for European residents. Neither country had an exchange rate arrangement comparable to
the ‘back door convertibility’ introduced by Britain in 1955.
Overall the analysis therefore largely conﬁrms the view of Kunz and others that there
was no unusual occurrence in the ﬁrst week of November. On the other hand we ﬁnd
that devaluation was considered likely by the market from the end of July onwards with a
corresponding loss of credibility. Thus it is not correct to argue that there was no sterling
crisis during Suez; it began well before the invasion.
4. RESERVES
We next examine daily data on Britain’s foreign exchange reserves, as a further way
to judge whether or not there was a sterling crisis in 1956. In addition, much of the
controversy over Suez has revolved around the exact timing and magnitude of British
reserve losses. Kunz, as discussed above, showed that Macmillan had overstated the size
of sterling losses in the week before November 6. She also (1991, p.150) pointed out that
the oﬃcial ﬁgures seriously understate the size of the reserve losses. Table 1 provides an
exact tabulation of the November balance sheet. The public was not informed that the
oﬃcial ﬁgure of $279 million reﬂected swaps and the sale of US Treasury bonds, and so did
not know that $360 million was spent on market intervention. These swaps and Treasury
bond sales were window dressing; these securities were not typically regarded as being
part of the reserves.14 Moreover, there was virtually no forward intervention during the
8crisis. In November 1956 only $13m were spent on supporting forward sterling and only
$30 million were spent in the year as a whole. For that reason, and because the dates of
transactions under $100,000 are not recorded, our daily intervention data do not include
transactions in the forward market. For November 1956, when the sales of part of the
British government’s portfolio of bonds and undelivered forward purchases are deducted
from the total, losses emerge as $405 million or more than a ﬁfth of the total reserves on
November 1.
We have used the Bank of England traders’ reports to reconstruct daily reserve changes
for the second half of 1956.15 Although access to the records of the Exchange Equalisation
Account is not permitted, the dealers’ reports provide an alternative source of information
on high-frequency reserve movements. We judge this source to be reasonably accurate,
because total reserve losses for November, as recorded in these reports, cumulate to $399.7
million, and total losses through intervention on the oﬃcial market are $333.4 million,
which are both very close to the ﬁgures in Table 1.16
Figure 3 presents total reserves on the basis of these daily data. The ﬁgure shows
a steady decline in reserves after the canal was nationalized, interrupted only by the
fortuitous sale of the Trinidad Oil Company for $177 million in August. Nevertheless
October shows little decline in the reserves, a development which parallels the behavior of
the one-month forward rate in that month.
Figure 4 presents market intervention. Positive entries represent increases in reserves,
while negative entries represent losses of reserves. The massive intervention which began
suddenly on 30 October is typical of a speculative attack on a currency. Taken together, the
steady loss of reserves followed by an acceleration in reserve losses and intervention are typ-
ical of the other currency crises described by Bordo and Schwartz (1996) and Eichengreen,
Rose, and Wyplosz (1996). Bordo and Schwartz found this pattern in 19 exchange rate
crises (excluding Suez) from 1797 to 1994. Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz documented
the same pattern in 22 crises between 1967 and 1992.
On the basis of these data the loss in the ﬁrst week of the crisis was somewhat higher
than that mentioned by Kunz, being $116 million, but they conﬁrm her conclusion that
the magnitude was relatively small. Her statement that “no Treasury or Bank of England
9oﬃcial mentioned the reserve loss as primarily New York in origin until November 20”
(1991, p. 132) is less accurate. In fact these reports on foreign exchange markets state
that the “New York market was extremely disturbed on the news of Israeli penetration into
Egyptian territory”. Other reports the Bank forwarded to the Treasury also stated that on
October 30 “in New York sterling was sharply oﬀered”.17 It seems unlikely however that
the Fed would have acted against sterling before Britain and France showed their hand
by preventing the UN from censuring Israel, an event which took place on the night of
October 30 (Kyle 1991, p. 364). Since one of these reports is speciﬁcally dated midday
it is unlikely that the Fed initiated the attack. Thus Macmillan was correct that sterling
was under pressure in New York, but probably not correct that the Fed was the seller.
As table 1 shows, market intervention was the overwhelming cause of the reserve loss.
Thus it seems that commentators at the time placed too much emphasis on the minor
attempts of Arab central banks to oﬀ-load sterling.18 The eﬀorts of the Bank of England
to ascertain who sold sterling indicate a considerable role for currency speculation. The
Bank’s oﬃcials found that as much as $120 million of the loss could be accounted for by
purchases of emergency reserves by oil companies. Also important, though much less so,
were purchases of sugar ($6 million), tobacco ($8 million), aircraft ($3.5 million) and ferrous
metals ($5 million).19 Excluding these purchases, which were responses to the expected
disruption of trade and oil supplies, and also excluding transfers to other central banks,
there remain $215 million of reserve losses as a consequence of speculation or sales by
panic-stricken holders of oﬃcial and transferable sterling.
Figure 4 also shows that the situation became worse throughout November. It was
in the last two weeks of November that “US pressure was at its height” (Kunz, 1991,
pp. 57-9; Kyle, 1992, pp. 500-503). The oﬃcial daily data suggest that the situation
was worse than recent historians imagined. Kunz (1991, p. 156), Kyle (1992, p. 500),
and Fforde (1992, p. 555) all stated that British oﬃcials believed that sterling parity
could not be maintained without a reserve of $2000 million. This ﬁgure was arrived at
in oﬃcial discussions from 1946 to 1948 and reﬂected judgements concerning the needs
of post-war reconstruction, the repayment of sterling balances held by members of the
sterling area, defence expenditure, and colonial development.20 An alternative explanation,
10which reﬂects the fragility of sterling, is that this ﬁgure is slightly less than the value
($2240 million) of sterling balances held outside the sterling area, which could be readily
converted to dollars (Fforde, p. 543). Kunz and Kyle observed that the authorities feared
that reserves would drop below this threshold once the debt service on the post-war US
and Canadian loans was paid in December. In fact ﬁgure 3 shows that this critical level
had already been crossed by the end of the second week of November.
Comparison with previous sterling crises suggests that the authorities had reason for
worry. Total reserve losses during the crisis between 26 July and 7 December 1956 were
$655 million, not counting the swaps and sale of short-term US securities in November
1956. This contrasts with the small net gain to the reserves of $56 million in the ﬁrst seven
months of 1956. These losses would have been even higher had not $177 million been
received for the sale of the Trinidad Oil Company, $54 million from Australia in October,
and a further $47 million from South Africa in November.
Reserve losses during other crises may serve as a standard of comparison. We exclude
the crisis of 1947, which ocurred in the exceptional conditions of full convertibility and
post-war recovery. Between 1 April 1949 and devaluation on 18 September 1949 reserves
fell by $564 million.21 During the crisis of September 1951-January 1952 the reserves fell
by nearly $900 million.22 During the crisis of 1955 the loss was $428 million between July
and December 1955. The average monthly loss during the Suez Crisis was thus greater
than that which occurred during any other sterling crisis and the total size of reserve losses
exceeded that in all crises yxcept that of 1951-2. The loss of $400 million in November
1956 greatly exceeded the highest loss in any single month during the previous crises ($254
million in October 1951). It is also worth noting that without the sale of the transfer of
gold from Australia losses in August-October alone, before the invasion of the canal zone,
would have been $483 million, comparable to those in the sterling crises of 1949 and 1955.
When the large transfers of gold from Australia and South Africa, the sale of the Trinidad
Oil Company and the US Treasury bill portfolio and the window dressing carried out by
forward operations in November are all taken into account, the total underlying loss of
reserves was $883 million. When one considers that this loss occurred over slightly more
than four months, a shorter length of time than all the other crises, Suez emerges as the
11most serious crisis of all.
The data we have uncovered on reserve movements thus indicate that Britain experi-
enced a serious exchange rate crisis between July 26 and December 7 1956. This conclusion
follows whether we compare the time path of reserve losses to those in other exchange rate
crises (as documented by Bordo and Schwartz (1996) and Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz
(1996)), compare the rate of reserve loss to those in other sterling crises (as described
by Dow (1964)), or measure the proximity of reserves to the authorities’ ‘action level’ of
reserves of $2000 million. The timing of reserve losses also corresponds with the loss of
credibility in the forward market, summarized in the Svensson-Morgenstern test of ﬁgure
2.
5. REACTION FUNCTIONS
Sections 3 and 4 have argued that exchange rates (spot and forward) and reserve
losses serve as measures of the ﬁnancial crisis. It seems natural to try to link these two
types of indicators statistically. To this end, we next focus on characterizing the reaction
function of the authorities in defending sterling. The benchmark is the form of reaction
function estimated in recent studies of intervention. Before summarizing those studies
and presenting evidence from 1956, we ﬁrst describe the multiple sterling/dollar exchange
rates.
In 1956 there were four types of sterling: that held by residents of the sterling area,
that held by residents of the dollar area (American account sterling), that held by residents
of other countries (transferable sterling), and blocked or security sterling which was owned
outside Britain and blocked or otherwise restricted during the 1939-1945 war.23 American
account sterling in turn consisted of oﬃcial sterling, used in current transactions, and reg-
istered sterling, used in portfolio transactions with dollars or gold. Markets for transferable
sterling had developed in Zurich and New York, where it traded at a discount, though in
volume comparable to that of oﬃcial sterling. During the Suez crisis, sterling was sold in
Zurich by China and by several countries in the Middle East.24
In March 1954 the discount on transferable sterling was negligible, and capital ac-
count restrictions on transferable sterling were removed. It could then be used outside the
12sterling and dollar areas, in the sterling area, or converted to dollars at a discount. In
February 1955 the UK introduced ‘back door convertibility’ when the Exchange Equali-
sation Account began to support transferable sterling in New York and Zurich within 1
percent of the oﬃcial rate, to discourage commodity arbitrage. As a result, the movements
of the transferable rate closely paralleled those of the oﬃcial rate during 1955 and early
1956. The transferable sterling market lasted until December 1958 when full convertibility
was established. Figure 5 graphs the values of oﬃcial and transferable sterling in New
York. The dashed, horizontal line shows the central parity for oﬃcial sterling, while the
solid, horizontal line shows the lower edge of the exchange-rate band, e. As the ﬁgure
shows, the discount on transferable sterling rose above 1 percent during the Suez crisis.
Transferable sterling provides valuable information in estimating a reaction function, for
its ﬂuctuations were not oﬃcially conﬁned by the Bretton Woods bands.
Reaction functions, as surveyed by Edison (1993), Dominguez and Frankel (1993), and
Almekinders (1995), typically take this form:
It = β0 + β1It−1 + β2(et − e∗)+β3(et − et−1). (5)
Here It measures intervention and It−1 is included to allow for serial correlation. The term
e∗ is a target level of the nominal exchange rate, while a reaction to et − et−1 represents
leaning against the wind. Some studies also test for a reaction to time-varying exchange-
rate volatility. Dominguez and Frankel also emphasized the need for daily intervention
data, which are available for the U.S., Japan, Germany, and Switzerland in the 1980s.
Studies which use such records include those by Eijﬃnger and Gruijters (1991), Goodhart
and Hesse (1993), Dominguez and Frankel (1993), and Almekinders and Eijﬃnger (1996).
In these studies the R2 in equation (5) ranges from 0.20 to 0.40.
In daily data from 1956, the ﬁrst reaction function we study is:
It = β0 + β1It−1 + β2(et−1 − 2.7825) + β3(ezt−1 − 0.99et−1). (6)
It measures daily market intervention by the Bank of England, measured as the resulting
change in reserves and graphed in Figure 4. A negative value represents a sale of dollars.
The terms et−1 and ezt−1 are the dollar exchange rates on oﬃcial and transferable sterling
13in New York on the previous day. These are closing prices, so it was not appropriate to
use current values (as in equation (5)) because the New York markets naturally close after
those in London. The lagged dependent variable in equation (6) allows for autocorrelated
news which inﬂuenced intervention. If we did not include this term, we might ﬁnd a
signiﬁcant reaction to exchange rates simply because there was autocorrelation in both
series.
The term et−1 −2.7825 gives the distance of the spot rate from the lower intervention
point, illustrated in ﬁgure 1. The term ezt−1 − 0.99et−1 indicates that a reaction was
triggered when the premium of oﬃcial sterling over transferable sterling rose above 1
percent. For example, this premium rose when oﬃcial sterling was on the Bretton Woods
ﬂoor during most of November, and there was downward pressure on transferable sterling.
Table 2 contains the results of estimating equation (6) in daily data from June to
December 1956. Saturdays and Sundays are omitted, as are December 25 and October
14, which were holidays in both countries. August 6 and December 26 were holidays in
the UK and also are omitted because there was no opportunity for intervention. July 4,
September 3, November 6, November 12, and November 22 were holidays in the US. On
those days the New York prices used apply to the previous day. This selection leaves 148
days, or 147 observations given the use of a one-day lag in equation (6). Estimation is by
ordinary least squares.
An inspection of the residual autocorrelation function revealed that the residuals are
positively autocorrelated, with signiﬁcant correlation coeﬃcients at lags 5, 10, 15, and
20. The results of formal Lagrange multiplier tests, shown in the table, conﬁrm that
higher-order autocorrelation is present. Although the standard errors are robust to auto-
correlation, this persistence in the residuals reﬂects some missing element in our modelling
of intervention. Moreover, the stability test in table 2 suggests that the reaction function
is not stable when the sample is split at 29 October, the date of the Israeli invasion of the
Sinai peninsula. Thus, although one could use equation (6) to estimate the impact eﬀect of
a depreciation (ˆ β2) and the long-run eﬀect of a depreciation (ˆ β2/(1− ˆ β1)) we defer making
these measurements while we examine the dynamic speciﬁcation.
Although we adopted the partial adjustment mechanism in equation (6) for compara-
14bility with studies of more recent intervention, we next added lags with the hope of better
capturing the dynamics. The equation estimated was:










γ3i[It−i − α1(et−i − 2.7825) − α2(ezt−i − 0.99et−i)].
(7)
In this case, intervention may respond to exchange rate values of the previous seven trading
days. Equation (7) is equivalent to a linear regression of It on six lags of itself and seven
lags of the exchange rates e and ez. The error-correction speciﬁcation is not necessary to
ensure stationarity of the regressors in data from the Bretton Woods regime. When the
exchange rate et is conﬁned to a band {e, e} it is stationary because all its moments exist.
Similarly, ezt is stationary provided that the transferable premium was bounded. However,
writing this distributed lag model as in equation (7) has the advantage of isolating the long-
run eﬀects of the exchange rates on intervention, which are given by the parameters α1
and α2.
Table 3 contains the estimation and test results. Much of the residual autocorrelation
is removed. By comparison with table 2, the Chow-test statistic reveals less evidence of
instability after the invasion, although the statistic is signiﬁcant at the 3 percent level.
When we examine the two parts of the sample, the general pattern is that t-values are
lower in the sub-sample of November and December 1956. Although the speciﬁcation
might still be improved, we base inference on this equation.
In Table 3 ˆ γ11 estimates the impact eﬀect of a depreciation in oﬃcial sterling while ˆ α1
estimates the long-run eﬀect. Both estimates are statistically and economically signiﬁcant.
They imply that a 1 cent decline in sterling in New York would lead to the expenditure
of 11.7 million dollars the next day by the Bank of England (with a standard error of
4.6 million dollars). The long-run eﬀect is an expenditure of 4.5 million dollars (with a
standard error of 1.5 million dollars). Thus the dynamic reaction function suggests that the
short-run reaction to a depreciation was considerably greater than the long-run reaction,
and was partly reversed in the week following an intervention.
Notably, a separate role is identiﬁed for transferable sterling. The impact eﬀect is both
15small and insigniﬁcant. However, in the long run a 1 cent drop in the value of transferable
sterling (towards 99 percent of the value of oﬃcial sterling) forecasts an expenditure of
4.9 million dollars of reserves in its defense (with a standard error of 1.6 million dollars).
In this case the initial reaction is smaller than the cumulative eﬀect. We also tested for
roles for forward premia in New York and for the same-day rate in London. None of these
variables was statistically signiﬁcant.
The ﬁndings can be compared to studies of intervention in the 1980s in several respects.
First, there is a relatively small role for the lagged dependent variable, possibly because
market participants did not directly observe It−1. In equation (6) the coeﬃcient on It−1 is
0.28 while the cumulative eﬀect of the It−i in equation (7) is 0.371. Actual reserve losses
were reported monthly, with a lag, and were the subject of rumor within each month.
Second, the R2 is comparable to those in studies of recent ﬂoats even though equations
(6) and (7) are forecasting equations and involve no same-day explanatory variables.
During part of this period, and especially during November 1956, oﬃcial sterling was
at its lower intervention point. In this case, much of It does not represent discretionary
intervention, but rather a loss of reserves required to defend the ﬁxed exchange rate. Here
the contribution of this study is simply to document for the ﬁrst time the daily reserve
losses, and relate them to news of the Suez crisis. But additional ﬁndings concern both
the nature of intervention when sterling’s value was above 2.7825 and the response to
transferable sterling.
During the crisis the the Bank of England spent about $30 million on the direct support
of transferable sterling, which table 1 showed was a small share of total intervention.
However, table 3 shows that the Bank’s support for oﬃcial sterling also responded to the
rate on transferable sterling. Our results suggest that transferable sterling can be thought
of as a shadow exchange rate, when oﬃcial sterling was at its ﬂoor.25 The strong reaction
of intervention to the discount on transferable sterling illuminates British ﬁnancial aims
during the crisis. This reaction reﬂected the importance attached by the Treasury and
the Bank of England to maintaining ﬁxed-rate convertibility, since the 1 percent spread
between oﬃcial and transferable sterling enabled ‘back door convertibility’.
A question of interest to economists is why the authorities rejected alternatives to
16defending the parity, in particular adopting a temporary ﬂoat. The answer was given by
Macmillan who told the Cabinet that this would lead to the break up of the sterling area
and the end of sterling’s role as a reserve currency. Direct warning of this danger was
given by the heads of seven sterling area central banks and conveyed by the Governor
to the Chancellor (Kyle, 1991, p. 453). The problem with such a strategy, which had
maintained sterling credibility during 18th and 19th century wars, was that Britain had
recently devalued. As George Bolton, the Executive Director responsible for the foreign
exchanges, put it:
Devaluation of sterling in 1949, while to some extent justiﬁed by the consequences
of the war, dealt the sterling system a blow from which it has not yet fully
recovered. If, in present circumstances, we tamper with the present untidy pattern
of rates or tend to regard reserves as more important than the present oﬃcial rate
of exchange, the sterling system may be ﬁnally prejudiced.26
Another traditional method of dealing with pressure on the exchange rate was of course
an increase in Bank Rate. Sir Roger Makins rejected this course of action, preferring, in
the Keynesian spirit of the time, to plan for a budget surplus in the next ﬁscal year.27
The contemporary economic orthodoxy held that Bank Rate changes were ineﬀective. The
classic statement of oﬃcial British Keynesian thinking on monetary policy, the Radcliﬀe
Report, stated that “we have had little evidence of actual movements of funds in response
to changes in shorter rates, or of any other measurable eﬀects on the exchanges.”28
6. CONCLUSION
This paper has analyzed the behavior of ﬁnancial markets and Britain’s foreign ex-
change reserves during the Suez Crisis. We ﬁnd that recent historians have been right to
downplay the signiﬁcance of the run on the pound in the ﬁrst week of November 1956.
Although this triggered a massive loss of reserves, the event did not signiﬁcantly aﬀect
forward exchange rates. The historians have been wrong however to assert that there was
no ﬁnancial crisis. From the moment the Canal was nationalized the sterling exchange rate
ceased to be credible and such credibility as had been regained was decisively reduced by
the invasion. At the end of November these pressures came to a head, as reserve losses and
falling exchange-rate credibility coincided and reserves fell below $2000 million. Moreover,
17the rate of reserve loss was greater than in other sterling crises.
In addition to providing new evidence on the credibility of sterling and the timing and
scale of reserve losses, we have characterized the Bank of England’s intervention tactics.
The Bank’s goal was to do everything possible to defend the current parity. If that failed,
a ﬂoat with uniﬁcation of the oﬃcial and transferable rates (rather than more controls)
would have ensued, according to internal Bank and Treasury documents.29 To the best of
our knowledge, we have provided the ﬁrst econometric study of intervention during the
pre-convertibility period of the Bretton Woods system. Statistical evidence shows that the
Bank used the Exchange Equalisation Account to react strongly to both the oﬃcial and
transferable sterling markets in New York.
In the Suez crisis, Britain was forced to abandon its political objectives in exchange
for IMF credit. But the Bank of England and Treasury achieved a limited success in that
they defended sterling without allowing a large discount on transferable sterling, until the
negotiation of the IMF and EXIM Bank loans. A widening of the transferable discount
would have been a signiﬁcant retreat from convertibility. Our ﬁnding that the British
authorities targeted this discount demonstrates that the they regarded convertibility as a
priority in 1956, before the members of the European Payments Union formally adopted
convertibility. The evidence also suggests that convertibility may have been regarded as
more important than the foreign policy objectives of the Suez expedition.
18Table 1: Movements of the Exchange Equalisation Account: November 1956
Type of transaction Amount ($ millions)
EPU settlements -30.6
US oﬀshore purchases 4.2
US aid 1.1
sterling area central banks -14.6
forward operations including swaps 84.5
market support: transferable sterling -30.9
market support: oﬃcial sterling -330.7
sale of US Treasury bonds 36.4
other transactions 1.3
Total -279.3
Source: BoE E1D 3/114: “Gold and Dollar Reserves”.
19Table 2: Daily Intervention Reaction Function: One Lag
It = β0 + β1It−1 + β2(et−1 − 2.7825) + β3(ezt−1 − 0.99et−1).
1 June - 31 December 1956: T = 147
ˆ β0 -4.98 (5.42)
ˆ β1 0.28 (2.27)
ˆ β2 293.25 (3.72)







Notes: It is the daily reserve change, et is the oﬃcial sterling exchange rate in dollars, and
ezt is the exchange rate for transferable sterling. Parentheses after coeﬃcients contain t-
values, based on heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors. LM(j)
is the Lagrange multiplier test for jth-order residual autocorrelation and F is the Chow
test statistic for stability, based on splitting the sample at 29 October. Parentheses after
test statistics contain p-values. R2 is the centered value.
20Table 3: Daily Intervention Reaction Function: Seven Lags










γ3i[It−i − α1(et−i − 2.7825) − α2(ezt−i − 0.99et−i)].
7 June - 31 December 1956: T = 141
ˆ γ0 -3.88 (2.88)
ˆ γ11 1167.43 (2.51)
ˆ γ21 20.23 (0.09)
ˆ α1 450.63 (3.03)







Notes: It is the daily reserve change, et is the oﬃcial sterling exchange rate in dollars, and
ezt is the exchange rate for transferable sterling. Parentheses after coeﬃcients contain t-
values, based on heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors. LM(j)
is the Lagrange multiplier test for jth-order residual autocorrelation and F is the Chow
test statistic for stability, based on splitting the sample at 29 October. Parentheses after
test statistics contain p-values. R2 is the centered value.
21APPENDIX A: A SUEZ CHRONOLOGY
Events which were secret, and unknown to markets, are in brackets.
19 July Dulles announces that the US will not fund the Aswan Dam.
26 July Nasser nationalizes the canal
27 July Britain blocks Egypt’s sterling assets
1 August Dulles meets Eden and Macmillan in London on Suez
16-24 August London conference of canal users issues declaration
that the canal will be run by its association and the UN
1 September Egypt announces that European pilots may leave Egypt
1 September (Approximate date of arrival of French troops in
British bases in Cyprus)
15 September Egyptian pilots successfully guide ships through the canal
19-21 September Second London conference of canal users fails to reach consensus
25-30 September Macmillan discusses Suez in Washington
25 September (France informs Israel they are ready for joint
action against Nasser)
26 September Britain and France request Security Council debate on
‘unilateral action by the Egyptian government’
30 September – 1 October (Secret French-Israeli conference at St. Germain to discuss
military cooperation against Nasser)
5-9 October Inconclusive Security Council debate in closed session
10-12 October (Secret negotiations between Britain, France, and Egypt agree
on six principles for settling the crisis)
10-11 October Large-scale Israeli raid on Qalqilya, Jordan
14 October Security Council accepts six principles but Russia
vetoes powers to canal users association
17 October France requests and is granted an IMF standby
credit of $262.5 million
19 October Russia agrees to Gomulka taking power in Poland, after
earlier threatening to prevent this
21 October Pro-Egyptian Nabulsi government wins Jordanian election
22 October (S` evres conference coordinates British, French, and Israeli
plan of action against Egypt)
2223 October Hungarian uprising
29 October Israel invades the Sinai peninsula
30 October Joint British and French ultimatum orders Israel and
Egypt to cease hostilities
31 October British and French air strikes against Egyptian air bases begin
1 November Emergency Security Council session
2 November Dulles introduces a General Assembly resolution
condemning Britain, France and Israel.
Imre Nagy appeals to the West for active support.
4 November General Assembly demands cease-ﬁre and
introduction of peace-keeping troops.
USSR army enters Budapest.
5 November Anglo-French force lands at Port Said.
USSR prime minister threatens Britain and France.
6 November Macmillan tells the cabinet of reserve losses, and
recommends acceptance of the cease-ﬁre, which is agreed.
7 November Israel accepts the cease-ﬁre.
8 November Eden orders preparations for withdrawal.
12 November Macmillan tells Parliament that sterling must
be devalued if reserve losses continue at the current rate.
20 November Tough oil rationing in Britain.
21 November Hammarskj¨ old tells the General Assembly that
the canal cannot be cleared until there
is a full British and French withdrawal.
24 November US votes for a Security Council Resolution calling
for immediate and unconditional withdrawal.
3 December Britain and France agree to withdraw.
6 December Nixon praises Britain and France in a public speech.
10 December IMF agrees to a UK drawing of $561.5 million
and grants a standby credit of $738.5 million.
21 December British and French troops complete their withdrawal.
23APPENDIX B: DATA SOURCES
Sterling exchange rates were collected from the New York Times for 1 June 1956 to 31
January 1957. Prices are found in the box “Foreign Exchange Rates” and are closing values.
The rates are the spot cable rate, 30, 60 and 90-day forward rates, and the transferable
rate, decimalized, in U.S. dollars. Data are daily. There are no quotations on Saturdays,
Sundays, and holidays listed in the text. French franc quotations were collected from the
same source.
Sterling spot and one-month forward rates, for 1 June 1956 to 31 January 1957, also
were collected from The Economist. Prices are found in the box “London Closing Exchange
Rates and Gold Price.” Diﬀerences between the rates in London and New York could be
arbitraged away, for the U.K. belonged to the dollar and sterling areas and the European
Payments Union. But we studied prices from both markets because (i) the London market
was open on Saturdays; (ii) the London market closed earlier each day because of the
time-zone diﬀerence; and (iii) The Economist reports a range of values whereas the New
York Times reports a single value. We averaged the London values, which produces a
smoother series than the New York series.
Market intervention by the Bank of England and other information on daily reserves
were collected from BoE C8/9 Foreign Exchange Dealers Reports in the archives of the
Bank of England.
24Notes
1. This account follows Horne’s (1988) authorized biography of Macmillan. See also Gorst
and Johnman (1997, pp. 139-141) who reproduce Macmillan’s pivotal memorandum to
the Cabinet of 20 November 1956.
2. Kyle (1991, p. 465). He subtitles this section of the book, ironically, “Macmillan’s
Reserves Depart.”
3. See BoE EC3/1: “A history of exchange control: An exercise by Mr. Ruddle”, p. 295.
4. Sir Roger Makins, Joint Permanent Secretary to the Treasury, noted the problem of
the Kuwait gap at the end of the Suez crisis: “We have felt inhibited from closing this
gap because, unless we had the full cooperation of the Ruler, it would be very diﬃcult to
administer any form of control and because there would in any case be a serious danger
of undermining the Ruler’s conﬁdence in sterling and in the advantages of the sterling
connection. The only fully eﬀective remedy is expulsion from the sterling area.” BoE
G1/99, 18 December 1956: “Policy if we do not succeed in holding the rate for sterling”;
Appendix A, exchange control measures.
5. See Einzig (1968) and Obstfeld and Taylor (1997).
6. BoE E1D/3/411: “Action likely to have been taken in November” and “Gold and dollar
reserves.”
7. BoE G1/124, 2 November 1956: Sir Denis Ricketts to Sir Leslie Rowan; “Emergency
action.”
8. BoE OV/31/55, 12 September 1956: “US aid for the oil operation.”
259. This behavior of the forward rate at monthly frequency was noted in studies con-
ducted soon after the crisis but is neglected in general histories of the crisis. See Bank for
International Settlements (1957, pp. 193-195) and Katz (1961, p. 8).
10. See for example “Strains on the Sterling Area”, The Economist 16 June 1956, p. 6.
11. See for example “Sterling at Support Point,” The Economist 1 September 1956, p.735.
12. See for example the discussion in BoE G124/1, 8 November 1956: “Crash action,”
and also Kunz (1991, p. 148). Sir Leslie Rowan stressed the importance of making these
payments: “In present circumstances it would obviously be most damaging to sterling if we
were openly branded as being in default.” BoE G1/124, 13 November 1956: JHR (Rowan)
to Sir Roger Makins, “Sterling.”
13. Garber and Svensson (1995) supply a comprehensive survey.
14. See Kunz (1991, p. 150) and Fforde (1992, p. 558) for a discussion of these transactions.
15. BoE C8/9: “Foreign exchange dealers reports.”
16. Total reserve losses, excluding forward operations and the sale of US Treasury bonds,
were $405.2 million. The discrepancies probably derive from the fact that the data in the
foreign exchange dealers’ reports are rounded to the nearest hundred thousand dollars.
17. BoE C8/9, 30 October 1956: “Foreign exchange and gold markets.” BoE C8/6,
mid-day 30 October 1956: “Foreign exchange and gold markets.” See also “Squeeze on
Sterling,” The Economist 15 November 1956.
18. Signiﬁcant losses would have occurred through this channel had not $42.7 million in
gold been made available by the South African Reserve Bank.
2619. BoE E1D/3/411: “Action likely to have been taken in November” and “Gold and
dollar reserves.”
20. See for example PRO cabinet memorandum CP(46)401, 29 October 1946, in CAB
129/14. In 1948 the Government published a White Paper (CMD 7545) which declared
that during EPU it would be necessary to maintain reserves at 550 million pounds ($2200
million).
21. See Cairncross and Eichengreen (1983, p. 147).
22. See Dow (1964, p. 73).
23. We rely on Fforde (1992) and the Bank of England’s own internal history, BoE EC3/1:
“A history of exchange control: An exercise by Mr. Ruddle.” See also Scammell (1965)
and The Economist, May 5, 1956, p.489.
24. See BoE C8/6 or The Economist 15 September 1956, p. 904. BoE C8/9 ‘Market report
for 6th November 1956’ noted that “transferable sterling was heavily oﬀered in Zurich in
a nervous and uncertain market.”
25. Kunz (1991, p. 136) stated that transferable sterling was “an indicator of the strength
of the currency.” Dow (1964, p. 86) quotes Heathcoat Amory, Chancellor of the Exchequer
in the late 1950s: “Some have argued I know, that ... we had the freedom to allow the
discount to widen in times of strain ... but in practice that freedom has simply not
been there. This is not only because a widening of the discount would have restored the
proﬁtability of commodity shunting; it is also because falls in the transferable rate – and
this is very important – would have advertised a weakness in sterling.” At the height of the
27crisis the Bank of England’s Executive Director, Sir George Bolton, stated that : “There
is no doubt that the unoﬃcial rates, particularly transferable sterling, inﬂuence foreign
opinion; the movement of the rate is undoubtedly regarded as a better indicator of the
condition of sterling than the oﬃcial rate.” BoE G1/124, 7 November 1956: “The foreign
exchange market.”
26. BoE G1/124, 7 November 1956: “The foreign exchange market.” British oﬃcials
regarded the potential internal and external results of ﬂoating as catastrophic: “ This
[ﬂoating] would be a catastrophe, aﬀecting not only the cost of living, the level of wages etc.
in this country but also having a disastrous eﬀect on our external economic relationships,
Sterling Area, Commonwealth, O.E.E.C., oil, etc.. Notes for Chancellor’s statement in
cabinet, 13 November 1956. Sir Leslie Rowan described ﬂoating as a “last resort”; BoE
G1/124, 1 November 1956: “Emergency action.”
27. “I believe there is no present case (subject to possible moves in overseas rates) for a rise
in Bank Rate. But there seems to be a strong case for a deﬁnite decision (to be announced
as soon as constitutionally possible) to work an overall budget surplus for 1957/8, and
also for an immediate review of all Government commitments both on capital and on
current account.” BoE G1/124, 16 November 1956: Sir R. Makins to the Chancellor of
the Exchequer.
28. Report of the committee on the working of the monetary system (1959, para 695).
29. Fforde (1992, p. 554); BoE G1/124 memo of Sir Roger Makins (Joint Permanent
Secretary of Treasury) to the Chancellor and “Note on a meeting at the Treasury on
Monday 19th November.”
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